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Bankruptcy and Free Speech:
New Bankruptcy Code Provisions Restrict
Attorneys' Right to Properly Advise Clients
by ROBIN HUFFMAN*
I. Introduction
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
("BAPCPA"), signed into law by President George W. Bush in April of
2005, went into effect October 17 of that year.' This sweeping legislation,
the result of more than seven years of Congressional debate and
compromise, marked the most significant overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code
since it was first enacted in 1978.2 As the title of the Act indicates,
Congress passed BAPCPA primarily in an effort to combat perceived
abuses of the bankruptcy process, particularly among consumer filers.
3
Congress noted in enacting BAPCPA that bankruptcy filings had increased
to the point where they were exceeding one million per year, and expressed
concern that consumers viewed bankruptcy as a first, rather than a last
resort.4 In passing BAPCPA, Congress sought to, "restore[] personal
responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure that the
system is fair for both debtors and creditors."
5
* J.D. 2008, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2001, University of
California, Davis. The author will be an associate at Steptoe & Johnson LLP in Phoenix, Arizona
starting in fall, 2008. She would like to thank Professor Linda Stanley and the Honorable Leslie J.
Tchaikovsky of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California for
sparking her interest in this topic. She would also like to thank her husband for his humor and
support, and her parents for their inspiration.
1. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 1 (2005).
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id. at 4-5. Perceived abuses include: multiple filings; filings by consumers with above
average income and primarily consumer debt; and fraudulent conveyances of property prior to
filing.
4. Id. at 4.
5. Id. at 2.
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Since BAPCPA became effective, numerous cases have been filed
across the country challenging various sections, and the courts have been
left to interpret the new provisions and sort out congressional intent. Cases
challenging the new requirements for consumer credit counseling,6 new
limitations on the automatic stay for multiple filings,7 and the Means Test
for Chapter 7 filers,8 among others, have all been decided since BAPCPA
became effective in October 2005.
One of the earliest and most significant challenges to BAPCPA has
been to the constitutionality of certain provisions which apply to debt relief
agencies. The term "debt relief agency" did not exist in the world of
bankruptcy prior to the recent BAPCPA amendments. 9 BAPCPA defines
"debt relief agency" as "any person who provides any bankruptcy
assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment of money or other
valuable consideration, or who is a bankruptcy petition preparer under
section 1 0. ' o BAPCPA created this new classification, and then
simultaneously placed restrictions upon what debt relief agencies can and
cannot do. Section 526(a)(4) of the amended bankruptcy code now
prohibits a debt relief agency to "advise an assisted person or prospective
assisted person to incur more debt in contemplation of such person filing a
6. See In re Murphy, 342 B.R. 671 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2006) (holding that BAPCPA does not
simply require debtors to obtain credit counseling prior to filing; the counseling must be obtained,
at the latest, the date prior to filing); In re Salazar, 339 B.R. 622 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (holding
that failure to obtain required credit counseling rendered bankruptcy petition ineffective and
precluded application of the automatic stay); In re LaPorta, 332 BR. 879 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005)
(holding that credit counseling is a non-waivable prerequisite to filing bankruptcy under
BAPCPA).
7. See In re Kurtzahn, 337 BR. 356 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2006) (holding BAPCPA creates
presumption that successive bankruptcy filings are filed in bad faith, and the presumption can
only be rebutted by clear and convinving evidence to the contrary); In re Taylor, 334 B.R. 660
(Bankr. D. Minn. 2005) (holding in cases where debtor seeks to extend the automatic stay on
showing of good faith filing, notice must be given to creditors 10 days pior to the hearing if
delivered by hand or 14 days prior by mail); In re Galanis, 334 B.R. 685 (Bankr. D. Utah 2005)
(holding that a totality of the circumstances test must be used to determining whether a debtor's
successive filing is in good faith).
8. See In re Paret, 347 B.R. 12 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (holding that even absent a
presumption of abuse under the means test, court must still consider each debtor's case under a
totality of the circumstances test, including consideration of the debtor's ability to repay debts, to
determine if abuse exists); In re Barraza, 346 BR. 724 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (holding debtor
can not overcome presumption of abuse under the means test by claiming ownership deduction on
a vehicle that is neither financed nor leased); In re Walker, No. 05-15010-WHD, 2006 WL
1314125 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 1, 2006) (holding that in calculating current monthly income
under the means tests, debtors are permitted to decuct average payments on debts secured by
surrendered collateral).
9. Milavetz v. United States, 355 B.R. 758, 762 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2006).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A)(2006).
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case under this title . . . ."1 Section 526(c) then creates civil liability for
violations of the enumerated duties of this section.' 2  Section 527(b)
requires specific written disclosures be made by debt relief agencies to
"assisted persons.' 13  The required disclosures include notifying the
"assisted person" that they have a right to hire an attorney and giving them
written information regarding their rights and responsibilities when filing
for bankruptcy.' 4 Section 528(b)(2) requires debt relief agencies to include
specific language in advertisements for their services.15
This note focuses on the constitutional challenge to these BAPCPA
provisions, and contends that at least two of the provisions in question,
sections 526(a)(4) and 528(b)(2), constitute a violation of attorneys' First
Amendment free speech rights. These sections of BAPCPA have already
been challenged numerous times in the less than two years since their
enactment. The multiple challenges to these provisions have achieved
mixed success, and more cases challenging these provisions are still
pending.16  Courts have split on the issue of whether attorneys have
standing to challenge BAPCPA, and those courts that have found standing
have split as to whether or not these provisions apply to attorneys at all.
Those courts that hold these sections do apply to attorneys have further
split as to whether they violate the First Amendment.
The inconsistency in judicial interpretations of these sections of
BAPCPA leads to uncertainty among bankruptcy attorneys as to whether or
not they are required to comply with the provisions, or if they may be
subject to sanctions for non-compliance. This uncertainty prevents
attorneys from providing debtor clients with the best possible counsel. The
disparity needs to be resolved by the Supreme Court in order to allow
bankruptcy attorneys to :confidently provide clients with the best possible
advice.
This note asserts that Congress intended for the provisions regulating
debt relief agencies to apply to attorneys, and bankruptcy attorneys have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of these provisions because of
the potentially chilling effect they have on attorney speech. Although
sections requiring attorneys to make certain disclosures to clients do not
unconstitutionally compel speech because they advance a compelling
government interest and do not create an undue burden, the provisions
11. 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2006).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 526(c) (2006).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 527(b) (2006).
14. Id.
15. 11 U.S.C. § 528(b)(2) (2006).
16. See, e.g., Conn. Bar Ass'n v. United States, No. 06-729 (D. Conn. May 11, 2006).
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requiring certain statements in advertisements fail an intermediate scrutiny
test for commercial speech because they do not narrowly advance a
compelling interest. Finally, and most alarmingly, the section restricting
attorney speech clearly violates attorneys' First Amendment rights, to the
detriment of attorneys, debtors, and the interests of the government,
because it fails constitutional consideration under either a strict scrutiny
test or a more lenient balancing test.
II. Attorneys Have Standing to Challenge BAPCPA Provisions
In considering whether attorneys are subject to these BAPCPA
provisions, and if so, whether the provisions are constitutional, courts must
first determine that attorneys have standing to challenge BAPCPA in the
first place. The fundamental consideration for constitutional standing
arises out of Article III, Section 2, which restricts federal courts to issuing
decisions involving "cases" or "controversies. 17  Standing requirements
have been thoroughly considered by the Supreme Court, and the Court has
held that standing is satisfied where the complainant has suffered actual
injury that is redressable by a favorable decision of the court.
18
The Supreme Court has defined three requirements that must each be
satisfied to establish constitutional standing. The plaintiff must
demonstrate (1) actual injury, (2) a causal link between the injury and the
challenged conduct, and (3) that the injury will be addressed by a decision
in their favor. 19  Courts hearing cases challenging these BAPCPA
provisions have split on whether attorneys satisfy these standing
requirements.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Georgia, in a January
2006 decision, dismissed the plaintiffs claim challenging BAPCPA for
lack of standing.20 In the case In re McCartney, the attorney, representing a
pair of debtors, sought a determination by the court that he was not subject
to BAPCPA's regulation of debt relief agencies. 21 The court did not come
to a decision on the merits, however, instead finding that there was no case
or controversy to satisfy a facial constitutional challenge because the
BAPCPA provisions were not being enforced against the plaintiff.22 The
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
18. Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983) (citing Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)).
19. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
20. In re McCartney, 336 B.R. 588, 592 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006).
21. Id. at 589.
22. Id. at 592.
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court notes that the plaintiff had not sustained any "real, actual, or direct
harm or injury," nor was he "in danger of sustaining any immediately
impending harm or injury" and thus his claims could not be adjudicated.23
In June 2006, a district court in Pennsylvania dismissed another case
challenging BAPCPA's debt relief agency provisions for lack of standing.24
In Geisenberger v. Gonzales, an attorney filed a facial challenge to the
BAPCPA provisions, claiming that he would be "irreparably harmed" by
their enforcement.25 The court notes, however, that the government has not
yet enforced, or even threatened to enforce, these provisions against the
plaintiff.26 The Geisenberger court found that the plaintiff was actually
seeking an advisory opinion, and noted that a long line of precedent
prevents courts from providing one.27
In Olsen v. Gonzales, an August 2006 decision, the court also
considered the issue of whether attorneys have standing to challenge
BAPCPA.28 The Olsen court noted that the plaintiffs' complaint did not
overtly allege injury, but rather "hint[ed]" at injury in alleging that the
BAPCPA provisions "chill[] speech by subjecting plaintiffs to sanctions
including disgorgement... ,,29 The court accepted this allegation of the
"chilling effect" the provisions have on attorney speech as sufficient
indication of harm.3°
Looking to the decision in New York Bar Association v. Reno, where
the court found "per se irreparable injury if enforcement of the statute
deprives a party of its First Amendment rights," the Olsen court stateed that
"a similar challenge could be made here.",3' The Olsen court finally held
that many of the plaintiff's challenges were not yet ripe because there had
been no enforcement, but also held that standing did exist for the provisions
of section 526(a)(4) because of the potential chilling effects on attorney
speech.32
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut found attorneys
challenging BAPCPA did have standing to bring their claims.33 In its
23. Id.
24. Geisenberger v. Gonzales, 346 B.R. 678 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
25. Id. at 680-81.
26. Id. at 682.
27. Id. at 683 (citing Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 784 (3d Cir. 1972)).
28. Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006).
29. Id. at 914.
30. Id. at 915 (citing Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006)).
31. Id. at 914 (citing N.Y. Bar Ass'n v. Reno, 999 F. Supp. 710 (N.D.N.Y. 1998)).
32. Olsen, 350 B.R. at 915.
33. Zelotes v. Martini, 352 B.R. 17, 21-22 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2006).
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November 2006 decision in Zelotes v. Martini, the court considered the
particular considerations involved in First Amendment challenges in
finding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge BAPCPA.34 The court
noted that "the First Amendment challenge has unique standing issues
because of the chilling effect, self-censorship, and in fact the very special
nature of political speech itself."35 In finding that plaintiffs had standing to
challenge BAPCPA, the Zelotes court also cited a Supreme Court decision,
stating that "the alleged danger of [the challenged statute] is, in large
measure, one of self-censorship; a harm that can be realized even without
an actual prosecution. 36
Because attorneys in these cases challenged BAPCPA based on First
Amendment free speech grounds, it is appropriate for courts to find
standing based on the potential chilling effects of the provisions, regardless
of whether actual enforcement has commenced.37  Absent judicial
determination on the constitutionality of these BAPCPA provisions,
attorneys may comply with the unconstitutional provisions against their
better professional judgment, or may fail to comply and face potential
prosecution. Attorneys have standing to challenge BAPCPA to have some
final determination as to the constitutionality and enforceability of these
provisions. And, as the Zelotes court held, the chilling affect that these
provisions have on how attorneys proceed in assisting their debtor clients is
sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy requirement for standing. 38
II. Bankruptcy Attorneys Are Debt Relief Agencies Within the
Meaning of BAPCA
In order to find that these BAPCPA provisions violate attorneys' First
Amendment rights, there must first be a threshold inquiry as to whether
these BAPCPA sections restricting and compelling speech even apply to
attorneys. If attorneys are not debt relief agencies within the meaning of
34. Id. at 21.
35. Id. (quoting Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 660 (5th Cir.
2006)).
36. Id. (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392 (1988)).
37. See Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 382 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding
plaintiff has standing to challenge campaign finance law even absent actual enforcement of the
law because the fear of civil penalties may be sufficient to chill speech); Babbitt v. United Farm
Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (holding that plaintiffs have standing to
challenge statute absent enforcement because the harm of chilled speech occurs even without
actual prosectution); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1972) (holding that constitutional
violations can occur based on the chilling effect a regulation may have on speech, even absent
actual enforcement).
38. Zelotes, 352 BR. at 21.
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the statute, they are not required to comply with these sections, and thus
their First Amendment rights are not violated.
Relying on the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code does not
provide a clear answer to this inquiry. One bankruptcy court left to sort out
congressional intent opined, "while the experts who drafted BAPCPA are
entitled to a failing grade in Legislative Drafting, 101, the Court is left to
determine what Congress intended." 39 Section 101(12A) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which defines the term "debt relief agency," does not include any
reference to attorneys. 40  The definition states, "The term 'debt relief
agency' means any person who provides any bankruptcy assistance to an
assisted person in return for the payment of money or other valuable
consideration, or who is a bankruptcy petition preparer under section
110 .... ,,41
Additionally, section 526 of the Bankruptcy Code is entitled
"Restrictions on Debt Relief Agencies," and makes no specific mention of
attorneys.42 Section 527 is entitled "Disclosures" and specifically applies
to "Debt Relief Agencies," but also make no specific reference to whether
this term includes attorneys.43 The somewhat ambiguous and confusing
statutory language has led to a split among bankruptcy courts in deciding
whether or not attorneys are subject to these BAPCPA provisions.
The first bankruptcy court to address this issue, in an opinion released
October 17, 2005, the day the BAPCPA amendments became effective,
chose to avoid the First Amendment inquiry altogether by holding that
attorneys are not included within the meaning of the term "debt relief
agency," and are thus not required to comply with these provisions.44 On
its own motion, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Georgia in the case In Re Attorneys at Law raised the issue of
whether the BAPCPA amendments "regulating Debt Relief Agencies apply
to attorneys licensed to practice law.",45 Relying mainly on the plain
language of the statute, the court held that attorneys are not included in the
term "debt relief agencies," and are thus not subject to these provisions.46
39. In re Reyes, 361 B.R. 276, 279 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) (2006).
41. Id.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 526 (2006).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 527 (2006).
44. In re Attorneys at Law, 332 B.R. 66, 71 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005).
45. Id. at 67.
46. Id. at 67-69.
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The court noted that the term "attorney" or "lawyer" does not appear
in the sections that refer to debt relief agencies.47 Rather, these sections
refer to "bankruptcy petition preparer" which is specifically defined in
section 1 10 of the act as "a person other than an attorney for the debtor...
who prepares for compensation a document for filing. 4 8 The court then
reasoned that, "because the definition of 'debt relief agency' omits express
reference to attorneys and includes a term which excludes attorneys, it is
difficult to imagine that Congress meant otherwise., 49 However, the court
failed to mention that while the definition of debt relief agency includes
reference to "bankruptcy petition preparer," which by definition excludes
attorneys, it also includes, "any person who provides any bankruptcy
assistance to an assisted person ... ," a statement that could certainly apply
to attorneys.5°
The court also noted that BAPCPA requires debt relief agencies to
inform assisted persons of their right to an attorney, and argued that it is
"hard to imagine" that Congress intended to require attorneys to inform
assisted persons of their right to an attorney. 51 The court concluded, based
on the plain language, that Congress intended to regulate those individuals
and businesses who aim to assist persons in filing bankruptcy, but are not
52licensed attorneys.
In January 2007, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Florida issued an opinion also stating that attorneys in general
are not subject to the provisions, and, in particular, attorneys who provide
pro bono bankruptcy assistance are not included with the term "debt relief
agency.,53 The attorney in this case provided pro bono representation to
the debtor, and the debtor sought a determination by the court as to whether
counsel fell within the meaning of "debt relief agency.
5 4
Relying on principles of constitutional avoidance, the court held that
further constitutional inquiry is unnecessary because the challenged
sections do not apply to attorneys. 55 The opinion briefly notes that "the
Court does not believe Congress intended the scope of the statute to include
attorneys. If Congress wanted 'attorney' included in the definition, it could
47. Id. at 69.
48. 11 U.S.C. § I 10(a)(1) (2006).
49. Attorneys at Law, 332 B.R. at 69.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) (2006).
51. Attorneys at Law, 332 B.R. at 70.
52. Id. at 69-71.
53. Reyes, 361 B.R. at 280.
54. Id. at 278-79.
55. Id. at 280.
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have accomplished [the] same by adding the word to 11 U.S.C. § 101
(12A). 56 The court applied greater analysis to whether attorneys providing
pro bono bankruptcy assistance in particular are subject to the BAPCPA
provisions that apply to debt relief agencies, and determined they are not.57
The court relied on the portion of the definition of debt relief agency
that states, "in return for the payment of money or other valuable
consideration. 58  Because an attorney providing pro bono assistance
receives no money in return for her services, the court held that pro bono
bankruptcy attorneys are not required to comply with sections 526, 527,
and 538 of the Bankruptcy Code.59 The court further held that even in
cases where the attorney reports the pro bono hours to the bar association,
the attorney is still not a "debt relief agency" because this act does not
constitute "valuable consideration" within the meaning of the statute.
60
Other bankruptcy courts addressing the issue have reached the
opposite conclusion, holding that attorneys are indeed included within the
meaning of debt relief agency under BAPCPA and are subject to the
challenged provisions. 61 In Hersh v. United States, decided in July 2006,
the plaintiff sought declaratory judgment that she, as an attorney, is not a
debt relief agency.62 The court in Hersh, however, held that attorneys are
included within the meaning of debt relief agency under BAPCPA.63
The Hersh court held that the plain meaning of the statute leads to a
reading of the term "debt relief agency" as including attorneys because debt
relief agencies are defined as "providing legal advice" and "only attorneys
are authorized to provide legal advice." 64 Additionally, the court noted that
section 101(12A) includes five specific exceptions that do not fall within
the meaning of "debt relief agency," and "attorney" is not among them.65
The Hersh court reasoned that if Congress intended to explicitly exclude





58. Id. at 280.
59. In re Reyes, 361 B.R. 276, 281 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007).
60. Id.
61. See Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19, 19 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Olsen v. Gonzales, 350
B.R. 906, 906 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006).
62. Hersh, 347 B.R. at 21.
63 Id. at 22.
64. Id. at 22-23.
65. Id. at 22.
66. Id. at 23.
FALL 2007 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY 127
Also, the disclosure requirements in section 527 include statements
that specifically apply to attorneys. For example, debt relief agencies must
issue a disclosure statement informing debtors that the law requires
bankruptcy petition preparers and attorneys to give the debtor a written
67contract. It seems clear from this statement that these provisions were
intended to encompass both bankruptcy petition preparers and attorneys.
The Olsen court in also held that attorneys qualify as debt relief
agencies under BAPCPA.68 The court in Olsen discussed the In re
Attorneys at Law decision at length, and concluded that although the
reasoning in that case is sound, analysis of legislative history points to a
finding that attorneys are included within the meaning of debt relief
agency.69 The court pointed to two specific portions of the legislative
history that lead to the conclusion that Congress specifically intended
attorneys to be subject to these provisions.
70
First, the congressional notes state: "The bill's consumer protections
include provisions strengthening professional standards for attorneys and
others who assist consumer debtors with their bankruptcy cases." 71 In
addition, the Olsen court noted that prior to the congressional vote on
BAPCPA, Senator Feingold (D-Wisconsin) proposed an amendment that
would have specifically excluded attorneys from the term "debt relief
agency," and Congress chose not to incorporate this amendment into the
final act.72
The text of the statute itself is not conclusive, and may even be
confusing. Additionally, the conflicting district court findings on the issue
leave bankruptcy attorneys uncertain as to whether they are truly required
to comply with these BAPCPA provisions. However, when an analysis of
the text of the statute is combined with relevant sources of the legislative
history, as noted by the Olsen court, it becomes clear that Congress
intended to regulate attorneys under the provisions of BAPCPA that apply
to debt relief agencies. After determining that attorneys are subject to the
provisions of these sections of the code, an inquiry must be made into the
substance of these provisions and whether they constitute a violation of an
attorney's First Amendment rights.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 527(b) (2006).
68. Olsen, 350 B.R. at 912.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt 1, at 1 (2005)).
72. Id. at 912.
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IV. Do the Provisions Violate Attorneys' Rights to Free Speech?
The provisions of the code regulating debt relief agencies, including
attorneys, have been challenged as both unconstitutionally restricting, as
well as unconstitutionally compelling speech. With regard to speech, the
First Amendment reads, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech .... ",7 The Supreme Court has interpreted the freedom
of speech to encompass both "the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all."74  Attorneys challenging these BAPCPA
sections argue that they compel them to make statements that may be
contrary to their interests, and restrict their speech such that they are unable
to properly advise clients.
A. Section 527 Does Not Violate the First Amendment
Attorneys have challenged section 527 as unconstitutionally
compelling attorney speech because it requires debt relief agencies to make
certain written disclosures to clients seeking debt relief assistance.
Attorneys, as debt relief agencies under BAPCPA, are required to supply
debtors with a copy of the following written notice:
If you decide to seek bankruptcy relief, you can represent yourself,
you can hire an attorney to represent you, or you can get help in
some localities from a bankruptcy petition preparer who is not an
attorney. THE LAW REQUIRES AN ATTORNEY OR
BANKRUPTCY PETITION PREPARER TO GIVE YOU A
WRITTEN CONTRACT SPECIFYING WHAT THE ATTORNEY
OR BANKRUPTCY PETITION PREPARER WILL DO FOR YOU
AND HOW MUCH IT WILL COST. Ask to see the Contract before
you hire anyone.
75
The required disclosure statement goes on to detail the debtors' rights
and responsibilities should they decide to file for either Chapter 7 or
Chapter 13 relief, including how to complete bankruptcy schedules, and
how to value assets, among others.76 These disclosure requirements are
being challenged as unconstitutionally compelling speech by attorneys who
feel the disclosures require them to make statements that are contrary to
73. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
74. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 527(b) (2006).
76. Id.
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their interests and may prevent potential debtors from receiving beneficial
attorney assistance.
It seems unlikely, however, that the Supreme Court would or should
find these BAPCPA provisions to be a violation of attorneys' free speech
rights. The Court has previously considered the constitutionality of statutes
regulating other professions in a similar manner. In Riley v. National
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, the Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of portions of a North Carolina statute regulating
charitable fundraisers. 7 The Court struck down the portion of that statute
outlining what constitutes a reasonable fundraising fee as violating free
speech because it was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government purpose.78
Applying an undue burden analysis, the Riley Court also struck down
portions of the same statute requiring professional fundraisers to "disclose
to potential donors, before an appeal for funds, the percentage of charitable
contributions collected during the previous 12 months that were actually
turned over to charity., 79 The Riley Court noted that "[m]andating speech
that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of
the speech" invoking constitutional scrutiny.80 The Court went on to note
that compelled statements of fact are no less subject to scrutiny than
compelled statements of opinion. 81 The Court held that these provisions
were not narrowly tailored, that they constituted a substantial burden to
fundraisers, and that other, less burdensome, more efficient means for
combating fraud were available.82  The court noted, however, that
preventing fraud is a compelling government interest, and that requiring
professionals to make certain disclosures is not necessarily
unconstitutional, but that "the First Amendment does not permit the state to
sacrifice speech for efficiency."
83
The Hersh court also noted, "as members of a licensed profession,
attorneys and other professionals are subject to regulation of their
professional activities by the state, which may extend to speech., 84 Hersh
analyzed section 527 using the "undue burden" standard applied in both
Riley and in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a 1992 case upholding a
77. Riley v. Nat'l. Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
78. Id. at 791.
79. Riley, 487 U.S. at 795.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 796.
82. Riley, 487 U.S. at 795.
83. Id.
84. Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19, 26 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).
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Pennsylvania law requiring doctors to provide women seeking abortions
with information about the procedure, including its risks.85 In Casey, the
Court held that the requirements did not violate the free speech of doctors
because it did not represent an "undue burden" on the doctors providing the
information, and also did not create a "substantial obstacle" to patients
seeking abortions.
86
The Hersh court went on to hold that "section 527 advances a
sufficiently compelling government interest and does not unduly burden
either the attorney-client relationship or the ability of a client to seek
bankruptcy., 87 The expressed congressional intent in passing BAPCPA
was to combat consumer abuses of the bankruptcy system, and the
requirements of section 527 are intended to ensure that consumers are able
to make fully informed decisions about entering into bankruptcy. 88 Hersh
argued that the government interest was compelling because among
"attorneys[] and their debtor clients, the consumer debtor is often at an
informational disadvantage," and that the compelled disclosures did not
present a significant burden on attorneys. 89 Hersh distinguished Riley by
noting that in Riley "the compelled disclosure will almost certainly hamper
the legitimate efforts of professional fundraisers" and the provision
"discriminates against small or unpopular charities." 90  In comparison,
Hersh states, of section 527, "the factual, viewpoint-neutral statement
provides a sufficiently benign and narrow means of ensuring that clients are
aware of certain general information regarding bankruptcy." 91
The court in Olsen largely followed the reasoning in Hersh in finding
that section 527 does not unconstitutionally compel speech.92  The
plaintiffs in Olsen argued that the required disclosures regarding the
availability of non-attorney assistance amount to "disclosure of an
opponent's viewpoint., 93 The court noted, however, that while attorneys
are required to make the disclosures, nothing prevents them from also
advising their clients as to "why a licensed attorney is beneficial. 94
85. Id. at 27; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
86. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
87. Hersh, 347 B.R. at 27.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 26 (quoting Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 799-800 (1988)).
91. Id. at 27.
92. Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 918 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006).
93. Id.
94. Id. at919.
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The requirements of section 527, while possibly cumbersome for
some attorneys, pass constitutional scrutiny under an undue burden test.
The required disclosures further a compelling government interest in
providing important information to debtors; they do so in a manner that is
not unduly burdensome to attorneys and do not prevent debtors from
receiving needed assistance. This section of BAPCPA is constitutional,
and should be upheld.
B. Section 528(b)(2) Unconstitutionally Compels Attorney Speech
The requirements of section 528, which regulates the advertising of
debt relief agencies and provides for certain disclosure statements to be
made in conjunction with all advertisements, are also subject to
constitutional scrutiny.95 Debt relief agencies are required to state in all
advertisements, "We are a debt relief agency. We help people file for
bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code," or "a substantially similar
statement., 96  Additionally, any advertising "directed to the general
public," must "disclose clearly and conspicuously in such advertisement
that the assistance may involve bankruptcy relief."97 Bankruptcy courts are
split as to whether these required statements constitute a First Amendment
violation.
The plaintiffs in Olsen argued that while they advise clients in
bankruptcy matters, they do not help clients to file for bankruptcy, and
therefore following the provisions of section 528 would require them to
make an untrue statement.98 The Olsen court conceded that this statement
would be untrue in regard to plaintiffs, but stated that, "section 528 does
not appear to violate the constitution in a facial challenge." 99 The court
argued that there is no apparent standard for judging compelled commercial
speech, but using standards in several previous holdings found that there is
no violation here.'00
Olsen looked to the "four-prong intermediate scrutiny test" for
commercial speech first announced in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York. 10 The first prong
requires that the speech in question is protected commercial speech under
95. 11 U.S.C. § 528 (2006).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 528(b)(2)(B) (2006).
97. Id.
98. Olsen, 350 B.R. at 919.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 919-920.
101. Id. at 919 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980)).
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the Constitution; the second prong requires the government to have a
substantial interest. °2 If both of these prongs are satisfied, the third and
fourth prongs look to whether the statute is narrowly drawn and advances
that substantial government interest.
103
The Olsen court found that the first prong of Central Hudson is easily
satisfied because the regulations involve commercial advertising statements
that are neither illegal nor misleading.104 In analyzing the second prong,
the court looked to the legislative history of section 528, and noted that
Congress's intent in enacting this section was to "[p]revent deceptive
advertising practices."' 0 5 The court thus concluded that the second prong is
satisfied because "[p]reventing fraud is a substantial interest.",' 0 6 Under the
third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson, section 528 must advance the
stated government interest of preventing fraud in advertising for
bankruptcy assistance services and must be narrowly drawn in achieving
this goal. The court concluded that the interest is furthered by the required
advertising statements because it "gives consumers more accurate
information to better determine what type of debt relief agency they may
require."' 7 The fourth prong requiring that the statute be narrowly drawn
was satisfied, according to Olsen, because "[t]he challenged provisions
only require debt relief agencies to insert a two-line admonition into certain
advertisements," and "generally applies to most consumer bankruptcy
attorneys while generally not applying to non-consumer bankruptcy
attorneys."
108
The Olsen court then noted that the Supreme Court has, in other cases,
applied a rational basis test1°9 or a strict scrutiny test in cases concerning
commercial speech." 0 The Olsen court concluded, however, that under
strict scrutiny, rational basis, or an intermediate scrutiny test, "the
regulation passes constitutional muster."111  The court notes that the
required advertisement statements are short and not cumbersome, and that
although they are untrue in the case of the plaintiff, the plaintiff could
102. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
103. Id.
104. Olsen, 350 B.R. at 919.
105. Id. at 920 (quoting 151 CONG. REC. H2063-01, 2066 (2005)).
106. Olsen, 350 B.R. at 920.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 921.
109. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
110. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988).
111. Olsen, 350 B.R. at 920.
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easily "add details to his advertisements such as he does not actually file
petitions."
1 12
In a December 2006 decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Minnesota denied the government's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs
challenge to section 528.1 3 The court in Milavetz v. United States also
looked to the four-prong test in Central Hudson as the standard for
regulations on "non-deceptive advertising."' 4 In Milavetz, the government
argued that a less stringent rational basis review is called for because the
BAPCPA regulations actually apply to deceptive advertising. 15  The
government argued that prior to BAPCPA, "some bankruptcy lawyers did
not mention in their advertisements that their ability to make 'debts
disappear' derived from the use of the bankruptcy process."' 16 The court
concluded, however, that there was no evidence that bankruptcy assistance
advertisements had been deceptive in any regard, and that the intermediate
scrutiny standard of Central Hudson should apply.' 17
In applying Central Hudson, the court concluded that the government
does not have a legitimate compelling interest in combating fraud in
advertising for bankruptcy assistance, remarking, "[s]etting aside the
implausibility of anyone actually believing in a magic wand capable of
making debt go away, it is most unlikely that the insertion of the [required]
statement... prevents consumer deception; it may well increase it.' '1 8 The
court also noted that the requirement that both bankruptcy attorneys and
non-attorneys providing bankruptcy assistance use identical language may
further increase consumer confusion." 9 Additionally, Milavetz concluded
that section 528 fails the fourth prong of Central Hudson, which requires
the statute to be narrowly drawn because it applies to anyone offering
bankruptcy services, not just those with misleading advertisements. 20 The
court opines that this section "broadly regulates absolutely truthful
advertisements throughout an entire field of legal practice," and that "[t]he
government... failed to show that this restriction on attorneys'
commercial speech is justified."'
2'
112. Id. at 919.
113. Milavetz v. United States, 355 BR. 758, 769 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2006).
114. Id. at 766.
115. Id.
116. Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 766.
117. Id. at767.




Section 528 is intended to combat fraud, which may constitute a
compelling government interest where the threat of fraud is real and
imminent. However, as the Milavetz court noted, the threat of fraud here is
not imminent, and the statute is not narrowly tailored to achieve this
purpose. 122 Therefore, section 528 does not pass constitutional scrutiny and
should be struck down.
C. Section 526(a)(4) Violates the First Amendment
Section 526(a)(4) includes the most blatant and problematic
constitutional violations in BAPCPA. The pertinent section reads:
(a) A debt relief agency shall not... (4) advise an assisted person or
prospective assisted person to incur more debt in contemplation of
such person filing a case under this title or to pay an attorney or
bankruptcy petition preparer a fee or charge for services performed
as part of preparing for or representing a debtor in a case under this
title. 123
In its July 2006 decision, the Hersh court was the first to rule this
BAPCPA section unconstitutional. 2 4 The court considered two alternative
tests to determine the constitutionality of the speech restrictions, and found
section 526(a)(4) failed to pass constitutional muster under either test.
1 25
As Hersh noted, most restrictions on speech are subjected to strict
constitutional scrutiny. 26  In order to withstand strict scrutiny, the
regulation must be "(1) narrowly tailored to promote (2) a compelling
government interest."'
' 27
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
considered the constitutionality of restrictions on broadcasting of certain
programming via cable television. 128 The Court held unequivocally, "as we
consider a content-based regulation the answer should be clear: The
standard is strict scrutiny.,' 129  Here, section 526(a)(4), in restricting
attorney speech based on content, clearly falls into this category.
122. Id.
123. 11 U.S.C. § 526 (a)(4) (2006).
124. Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19, 27 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).
125. Id. at 25.
126. Id. at 24.
127. Id. (citing United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)).
128. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 811.
129. Id. at 814.
t ....
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Nevertheless, the government argued in Hersh that section 526(a)(4)
constitutes an ethical regulation and is subject to a lesser level of
scrutiny. 130 The government based its argument on a balancing test used in
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, which considered a statute regulating
statements to the press by attorneys representing criminal defendants.1 31 In
Gentile, the Court employed a balancing test and determined that the
statute achieved a "constitutionally permissible balance" because it "served
the State's legitimate interest" and "impose[d] only narrow and necessary
limitations."'1
32
Hersh noted, however, that both strict scrutiny and the balancing test
employed in Gentile require that the statute be narrowly drawn in
advancing the government's interest. 133 In analyzing whether or not section
526(a)(4) is sufficiently narrow under either strict scrutiny or a balancing
test, the Hersh court held that it is not. 134 The compelling interest the
government sought to advance with section 526(a)(4), as articulated in
Hersh, was "to end the manipulation of the system by certain filers who
took on additional debt prior to bankruptcy.' 35  Section 526(a)(4),
however, hardly seems narrowly tailored to effectuate this stated purpose.
The Hersh court noted that the speech banned in section 526(a)(4)
prevents attorneys from "advising clients to take actions that are lawful,
even under BAPCPA.' 36  The court went on to list several situations
where taking on additional debt may be not only lawful, but beneficial,
including "refinancing at a lower rate to reduce payments and forestall or
even prevent entering bankruptcy," and "taking on secured debt such as [a]
loan on an automobile that would survive bankruptcy and also enable the
debtor to continue to get to work and make payments.' 7  Section
526(a)(4), in prohibiting attorneys from advising clients to take on debt, is
overly inclusive because it "prevents lawyers from advising clients to take
lawful actions" and "it extends beyond abuse to prevent advice to take
prudent actions.1 38  The court held that this is far more than what is
"narrow and necessary" even under the Gentile balancing test. 39
130. Hersh, 347 B.R. at 24.
131. Id. (citing Gentile v. State Bar ofNev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991)).
132. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075.
133. Hersh, 347 B.R. at 24.
134. Id. at 25.
135. Id. at 24.
136. Hersh, 347 B.R. at 24.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 25.
139. Id.
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In its August 2006 decision, the court in Olsen largely followed Hersh
in finding section 526(a)(4) unconstitutional. 40  Olsen reiterated that the
restrictions of section 526 prevent attorneys from providing clients with the
best advice because they cannot advise debtors to take on additional debt
even though "sometimes taking on more debt could be the most financially
prudent option."' 41 The Olsen court found that the restrictions of this
section are not narrowly tailored to prevent abuse of the system, as required
under either strict scrutiny or a balancing test, because "it also ensnares
advice regarding lawful actions."'
142
In Zelotes, the court also found section 526(a)(4) facially
unconstitutional under either strict scrutiny or the Gentile balancing test.
143
The Zelotes court also noted that other less restrictive means may be
available to address the government's concerns about debtor fraud,
including "eliminating the incentives for opportunistic action or enacting
penalties for those who take on such debt prior to filing for
bankruptcy ....
In the most recent case to come to a conclusion on the
constitutionality of section 526(a)(4), the Milavetz court in December 2006,
also found this section facially unconstitutional. 45  The Milavetz court
found that 526(a)(4) is a content based restriction and therefore applied a
strict scrutiny standard of review. 146 In Milavetz, the government argued
that it had a compelling interest in "deterring debtors from 'gaming' the
means test by improperly enlarging pre-existing debt ... protect[ing]
debtors from attorneys who might lead them to abusive practices ... [and]
protect[ing] the integrity of the bankruptcy system." 147 The Milavetz court
found, however, much like the courts in Hersh, Olsen, and Zelotes, that
even if the government has a compelling interest at stake, 526(a)(4) is not
narrowly tailored to effectuate this interest.
148
The government in Milavetz attempted to argue that section 526(a)(4)
is in fact narrowly tailored because "it does not limit more speech than is
necessary to accomplish this purpose."' 49 The court categorically rejected
140. Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 916 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Zelotes v. Martini, 352 B.R. 17, 22 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2006).
144. Id. at 24.
145. Milavetz v. United States, 355 B.R. 758, 766 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2006).
146. Id. at 764.
147. Id. at 765.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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the government's argument, stating, "[a]ttorneys have a First Amendment
right-let alone an established professional ethical duty-to advise and
zealously represent their clients."' 5° The court opined that this section
prevents attorneys from properly advising clients as to the best course of
action. 151
By prohibiting attorneys from advising their clients to take these legal
actions, section 526(a)(4) prevents attorneys from providing debtors with
the best possible assistance. Forcing attorneys to comply with this
provision not only fails to further the government's interests, it may even
thwart them. In enacting BAPCPA, the government sought to combat a
"generally consistent upward trend" in the number of bankruptcy filings
which resulted in "adverse financial consequences for our nation's
economy.' 52  However, this section, by prohibiting attorneys from
advising debtors to take actions that may in fact prevent them from
requiring bankruptcy protection, is inconsistent with this stated goal.
V. Conclusion
When Congress passed BAPCPA, it did so with the intent of reducing
abuses of a bankruptcy system that had largely been unchanged for more
than twenty years. There can be little doubt that the aging Bankruptcy
Code was ripe for revision, and that many of Congress' concerns were well
founded. However, the resulting final BAPCPA legislation, the product of
years of congressional comprises, includes several ambiguous and
constitutionally questionable sections that have left the courts fraught with
BAPCPA litigation.
In particular, the BAPCPA provisions applying to debt relief agencies
have led to confusion. The many cases challenging these provisions that
have already made their way through the courts have resulted in circuit
splits that only serve to further confuse the issue. The First Amendment
implications of these provisions require courts to consider the potential
chilling effects on attorney speech, even absent actual enforcement.
Attorneys have standing to bring cases challenging these provisions
because of these potential chilling effects and courts should allow these
cases to be heard in order to reach a decision on the merits.
Additionally, although the provisions are ambiguous on their face,
when statutory language is considered in combination with the legislative
history, it is clear that Congress intended the term debt relief agency to
150. Id. (citing Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548-549 (2001))
151. Id.at765.
152. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 3-4 (2005).
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include attorneys providing bankruptcy assistance. Since Congress
intended for attorneys to comply with these provisions, and attorneys have
standing to challenge them, it is imperative that courts reach some cohesive
conclusion as to their constitutionality.
The disclosure requirements of section 527 do not violate attorneys'
free speech rights because they further a compelling government interest in
a manner that is not overly burdensome for attorneys. The required
statements are short, factual, and attorneys are permitted to add information
to clarify what services they offer. Therefore, section 527 is constitutional
and should be upheld.
Conversely, the advertising disclosure requirements of section
528(b)(2) unconstitutionally compel speech because the purported
government interest they serve is not compelling or imminent, and the
requirements are not narrowly tailored to achieve that supposed purpose.
Section 528(b)(2) should be struck down as unconstitutional.
Finally, and most alarmingly, section 526(a)(4) unconstitutionally
limits speech to the detriment of attorneys and debtors alike. Prohibiting
attorneys from advising clients to take on additional debt fails either strict
or intermediate scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve the
government's goals. Section 526(a)(4) may in fact thwart the
government's purported goals by prohibiting attorneys from advising
clients to take lawful actions that may in fact prevent them from needing to
seek bankruptcy protection. Section 526(a)(4) thus constitutes a flagrant
violation of the First Amendment and courts should strike it down.
Until these issues are resolved and the unconstitutional provisions
stricken, attorneys are left unable to provide their debtor clients with the
best possible assistance without fear of prosecution. Furthermore, debtors
may not receive complete information regarding their options in reducing
the impacts of bankruptcy or avoiding the need to file altogether. As
appeals on these decisions continue to make their way through the court
system, it is imperative that the Supreme Court consider these issues at the
first opportunity in order to clear up confusion and strike down the
unconstitutional BAPCPA provisions.
